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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

THE FUTURE OF HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE

RUTI TEITEL*

I. INTRODUCTION
It is a great pleasure to be invited to respond to Professor Harold Koh’s
Childress Lecture, A United States Human Rights Policy for the 21st Century.
Harold became a dear friend during my days at the Yale Law School as an
Orville H. Schell Fellow for International Human Rights, when it was also a
privilege to teach his class in International Human Rights.
My paper shall discuss three principles proposed in Professor Koh’s
address. Professor Koh begins his address with a call for “truth.” His second
argument calls for justice and accountability. Lastly, Koh calls for greater
transnational engagement in broader democratization efforts.
In this Response, I shall consider each of these in turn. The proposed
principles of “truth” and “accountability” are forms of “transitional justice,”1
that is, legal responses to past wrongs, taken ex post to redress violations of
human rights. These proposals raise a profound question: To what extent
would normalizing the transitional response in the law contribute to an
improved human rights policy?
The question that arises is, to what extent would the application of these
legal principles be ameliorative of the current status of human rights.2 To
answer this question, we need a theory that explains the present relation of
these legal principles to international politics. What is impliedly at stake in
both of these claims is the question of the purposes and effects of human rights
in the advancement of enlightened foreign policy and, more particularly, of
efforts to advance democratization and liberalization in international relations.
At minimum, as is further elaborated below, this Response contends that
these principles do have an effect, by their contribution to an expanded global
humanitarian regime. A strengthened humanitarian discourse appears to be
* Ruti Teitel, Ernst C. Stiefel Professor of Comparative Law, New York Law School. My
gratitude to Camille Broussard and Jill Dworzanski for their research assistance.
1. RUTI G. TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE (2000).
2. There is a growing literature on these legal responses to inhumanity and political
repression, chiefly in periods of political transition. See generally TEITEL, supra note 1. See also
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: HOW EMERGING DEMOCRACIES RECKON WITH FORMER REGIMES (Neil
J. Kritz ed., 1995).
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particularly apt in the contemporary transformed world of post-transition
heightened political violence.3 It is in response to violence that transitional
justice surges. In the last part of this Response, I explore the broader
significance of the contemporary expansion in human rights discourse,
including its ramifications for U.S. foreign policy, particularly in light of
recent political events.4
II. ON TRUTH
In the first part of his address, Professor Koh argues for the obligation to
tell the truth, and elaborates upon several dimensions of the duty.5 One might
differentiate between internal and external dimensions, relating to the role of
truth in American foreign policy, as well as in its own domestic policy. To
begin, there is the obligation of the United States to “tell the truth” about
human rights around the world. This obligation, as Professor Koh asserts, is
being discharged today in State Department reports.6 Moreover, it appears to
be a duty well on its way to being satisfied, and in part through those practices,
to have become a recognized aspect of customary human rights law.7
Beyond the duty of investigation of violations of human rights generally,
Professor Koh proposes that there is a second obligation of “truth-telling.”8
This dimension of the duty goes to the problem of the lack of transparency
concerning the United States’ potential violations of international human rights
law in its own policy. In discussing this aspect of the truth principle, Professor
Koh addresses the U.S. obligation to adopt the language of international human
rights, and to represent its own behavior in these terms.9 However, by its
3. See infra notes 55-61 and accompanying text.
4. Namely, the September 11 attacks on the United States, as well as the various military
and political responses thereto. See infra notes 55-61 and accompanying text.
5. See Harold Hongju Koh, A United States Human Rights Policy for the 21st Century, 46
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 293 (2002).
6. See 22 U.S.C. § 2304(b) (Supp. V 1999); 22 U.S.C. § 2151 (1994 & Supp. V 1999); U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND LABOR, 1999
COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES (released Feb., 2000), available at
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/1999/ (last visited Mar. 12, 2002); U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND LABOR, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN
RIGHTS PRACTICES 2000 (released Feb., 2001), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/
2000/ (last visited Mar. 12, 2002).
7. On customary law, see Statute of the International Court of Justice, 1945 I.J.C. ch. 3, art.
39, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ibasicdocuments/ibasictext/ibasicstatute.htm (last
visited Mar. 12, 2002) [hereinafter ICJ Statute].
8. See Koh, supra note 5, at 306.
9. See Harold Hongju Koh, Introduction, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, BUREAU OF
DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND LABOR, 1999 COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS
PRACTICES (released Feb. 25, 2000) (contending for the U.S. commitment to “us[e] the universal
language of human rights”), http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/1999_hrp_report/
overview.html.
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general unwillingness to join the human rights discourse, Professor Koh
observes, the United States is in some measure failing to join the regime. The
concerns here are twofold. At one level, the argument concerns the problem of
the gap between American human rights practices and its normative policy.
An added dimension of the claim concerns America’s leadership role in the
world in setting human rights norms. In this regard, the argument for truthtelling goes to the very legitimacy of the United States’ human rights
campaign. To whatever extent there is a failure to satisfy the truth-telling duty,
one might conceive this to be a form of “tu-quoque;” or, unclean hands.10 Or,
it could be understood as a form of de facto cultural relativism, meaning, the
oppression of ostensibly exceptional “American values.” Together, these
claims raise a twofold challenge both to U.S. practice, as well as to its
leadership role in international relations.
The first claim goes to the independent basis for truth-tellings, and its
potential role, and strategic value in the advancement of human rights. At
present, there are arguments both for an individual “right” to truth and,
relatedly, for attendant “obligations,” on the part of states, and perhaps others
to tell the truth.11 These derive from recent developments in “transitional
justice,” developing standards regarding the legal responses to past official
wrongdoing.12 The logic of these truth claims’ relation to human rights in the
context of transitional justice, is that knowledge makes a difference for a
state’s democratic prospects. At present, this claim is largely vindicated in the
contemporary importance of the practice of documentation of human rights.
This transitional response appears to have become normalized, and converted
into a norm of legal responses to human rights violations, even in
nontransitional times. Indeed, one might say this has become a dimension of
customary human rights law.13
To illustrate the potential for the proposed truth principle, Professor Koh
offers the problem of the United States’ death penalty policy.14 American
policy concerning the death penalty appears to be out of step with human rights
law, as well as with political and legal developments around the world.15
10. WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
88 (2001).
11. As a matter of human rights law, the duty is situated in the state, even where private
actors are implicated in the relevant wrongs. See Velasquez-Rodriguez, Inter-Am. C.H.R. (Ser.
C) No. 4, at para. 166, OEA/ser. L/V/III.19, doc. 13 (1988), reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 291, 324
(1989) (“[T]he States must prevent, investigate and punish any violation of the rights recognized
by the Convention and . . . restore the right violated and provide compensation as warranted.”)
(emphasis added).
12. See generally TEITEL, supra note 1.
13. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
14. See Koh, supra note 5, at 309-11.
15. See generally United States, in HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2002,
http://www.hrw.org/wr2k2/us.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2002). See USA: Executions Would
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Nevertheless, whatever one might say about U.S. policy as a normative matter,
there is a real question about whether, and to what extent, this issue lends itself
to resolution via the truth principle. Would the U.S. death penalty policy be
affected by greater dissemination of knowledge regarding the death penalty?
To what extent is the determinative factor in policymaking the issue of access
to relevant information? In an open democracy, such as the United States, to
what extent is knowledge likely to be the critical factor affecting decisionmaking concerning human rights policy?
Ultimately, the role of knowledge in decision making is complex, and goes
to the question of how human rights policy is fashioned in the United States.
Along what processes and mechanisms? Which political actors? The answers
to these questions may well turn out to have empirical dimensions upon which
more research is needed. Indeed, to date, contemporary comparative research
regarding American and European policy on the death penalty has elucidated
the relevance of the factor of the political actor, comparing in particular, the
pivotal role of elites in deciding the issue in Europe, with more populist
decision makers in the United States.16 Understood in this comparative light,
then, the relevant question would be, what might be the role of additional
“truth” processes in the attempt to change the evaluation of the death penalty
by populist forces in the United States? And, relatedly, given the political
actors, what kind of knowledge would be useful in changing American policy
concerning the death penalty?17

Indicate Empty Rhetoric of State of the Union Address, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL ON LINE,
Feb. 13, 2002, http://web.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/Index/AMR510322002?OpenDocument&of=
THEMES/DEATH+PENALTY. See also Pierre Sane, Secretary General, Amnesty International,
An Open Letter to President Bill Clinton as the First Federal Execution Looms (Nov. 14, 2000),
available at http://web.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/print/ AMR511642000 (last visited Mar. 11, 2002)
[hereinafter Amnesty International Letter].
16. See David Greenberg & Valerie West, Siting the Death Penalty Internationally (2000)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). Particularly important is the role of the Council
of Europe, which in 1998 called for a ban on the death penalty. See id. Ultimately change in
such state practices could affect the direction of customary law. See ICJ Statute, supra note 7, art.
39; FIFTY YEARS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF SIR
ROBERT JENNINGS (Vaughan Lowe & Malgosia Fitzmaurice eds., 1996); Arizona v. Ring, 25
P.3d 1139 (Ariz. 2001), cert. granted, 70 U.S.L.W. 3246 (U.S. Jan. 11, 2002) (No. 01-488)
(comparing relative roles of judge and jury as decisionmakers for various elements of death
penalty sentencing). On the potential role of knowledge in the judiciary, compare Stanford v.
Kennedy, 492 U.S. 361, 369 n.1 (1989), where Justice Scalia asserted that the laws of other
nations are of little relevance to the interpretation of the Eight Amendment bar on “cruel and
unusual punishment” in the context of executions of juveniles, with Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487
U.S. 815, 830-31 (1988).
17. There are possible developments at the present moment regarding the role for DNA
evidence, but this is a limited role for truth, as it is directed more at select human rights violations
in the administration of the death penalty, rather than to its abolition. See The Innocence Project,
available at http://www.innocenceproject.org (last visited Mar. 12, 2002). For discussion of this
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So understood, there are a number of areas where added knowledge might
make the difference. For example, American support for the death penalty
policy does appear to be, at least in part, a function of the extent to which the
public is presented with alternative policy considerations.18 Moreover, there
are added transitional justice considerations concerning the administration of
the death penalty; as in its application, American policy appears to violate
numerous international rights norms.19
The same sorts of questions regarding the potential for truth-telling
processes arise with respect to American human rights policy. Consider to
what extent does the dearth of knowledge regarding these principles affect the
direction of the United States’ commitments in this area? Here, one might
understand the relevant absence of knowledge at a broad level of generality,
and in the context of America’s historical isolation from other countries’
human rights practices. This has implications for the normative impact of
these state practices for the evolution of human rights law regarding the death
penalty, as well as in other areas.
III. ON JUSTICE
The second part of Professor Koh’s address discusses the importance of
principles of accountability. Here, Professor Koh identifies the significant
momentum of recent decades for various forms of justice, in response to past
regime wrongs.20 Transitional justice policy recommendations have been used
around the world, in particular, to shape democracies in processes of
transformation from dictatorship to more liberalization.21
However, beyond its role in periods of political change, to what extent
should this normative policy be extended to established democracies? The
proposed extension in the application of transitional principles of justice to the
United States at this time raises numerous questions. First, as a general matter,
just how well has the transitional justice response worked? Second, where

strategy’s implications for the abolition movement, see Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker,
Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital
Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355 (1995); Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Should
Abolitionists Support Legislative Reform of the Death Penalty?, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 417
(forthcoming 2002).
18. Such considerations include, for example, sentencing alternatives. See Joseph Carroll,
Poll Summary: Where America Stands on Death Penalty, GALLUP NEWS SERVICE, Dec. 14,
2000, available at http://www.gallup.com/poll/releases/pr001214b.asp (last visited Mar. 12,
2002).
19. For racial considerations in the application of the death penalty, see Amnesty
International Letter, supra note 15. Regarding the human rights problems in the execution of
juveniles, see Atkins v. Virginia, 534 S.E.2d 312 (Va. 2000), cert. granted, 533 U.S. 976 (2001).
20. See generally TEITEL, supra note 1.
21. See id.
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extended to the United States, would adopting the transitional justice response
result in a more enlightened human rights policy?
To begin, in partial answer to these questions, one must recognize the
Instances of
relatively modest contributions of transitional justice.22
accountability are few, and do not always translate to developments in
prospects for democratic transition, although this evaluation ought to be
temporized.23 Moreover, the question of justice, while it ought not be limited
to periods of political transition, should also not be divorced from its political
context. Accordingly, transitional justice associated with periods of political
flux, should not necessarily become the normalized response in the
international realm. Indeed, the aims of law and justice in the international
realm are not necessarily the same as those in domestic law. In the
international realm, given the confluence of diverse societies, what is
commonly at stake are competing legalities.24
The more significant question raised by the extension of the principle of
transitional justice goes to its aims. What is human rights law for? What is its
impact on foreign affairs? The United States has generally been an outlier
here. Indeed, American resistance to the human rights discourse suggests that,
for the most part, America operates as if it does not regard itself as “needing”
human rights law at present. This suggests a broader issue that Professor
Koh’s address impliedly engages: namely, what are the broader ramifications
of the contemporary human rights regime for contemporary international
politics? Is there something beyond “justice talk” that would place demands
upon a country in the position of the United States? How might this affect
current foreign policy?
In the contemporary moment, there has been a significant upsurge in a
discourse of transitional justice; in part, explainable by recent political
developments. At present, states in various stages of transition—post-cold
war, post-colonial, post-authoritarian—are dealing with often long-postponed
responses to repressive regimes. Moreover, the recent transitions have, for the
most part, been peaceful, political transformation has been characterized by its
occurrence in, and through the law. Hence, the significance of transitional
justice.
The legal responses have taken a variety of forms. Many of these
responses are national in character; others are international25 and

22. See Ruti Teitel, Bringing the Messiah Through the Law, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN
POLITICAL TRANSITIONS: GETTYSBURG TO BOSNIA 177 (Carla Hesse & Robert Post eds., 2000).
See Jose E. Alvarez, Crimes of State/Crimes of Hate: Lessons from Rwanda, 24 YALE J. INT’L L.
365 (1999) (discussing the limited effectiveness of international criminal prosecutions).
23. See generally Teitel, supra note 22.
24. See generally id.
25. See TEITEL, supra note 1, at 27-29.
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transnational.26 Of late, there has been a dramatic expansion of the
humanitarian law regime—the historic law of war—which has resulted in a
standardization of the law of war regime to international adjudicatory
processes of political controversies.
But, this near-normalization of
transitional justice raises numerous normative questions about the propriety of
international criminal law for the resolution of political conflicts.27
The most significant dimension in this paradigm shift point is that the
discourse is one of “justice,” and that this discourse is sui generis, and ought
not simply be confounded with a discourse of “rights.” At present, there
appears to be an extraordinary expansion of humanitarian law, in what might
aptly be understood as a merger of two regimes: the “justice” regime
associated with the law of war, together with the “international human rights”
regime.28 Nevertheless, “justice talk” is not simply coterminous with “rights
talk.” Whereas the discourse of international human rights is a relatively
modern phenomenon,29 the discourse of international criminal justice relates to
a much older part of public international law. Historically, the discourse of
justice is a traditional part of the rationale of the law of war in international
affairs.30 Whereas, at present, the discourse of international criminal justice
relates less to the behavior of states, than the protection of the rights of persons
and peoples.
Indeed, the shift to a humanitarian law regime, and the discourse of justice
signals a rule of law that is both constraining and enabling of government
power. In the foreign policy context, the discourse of justice is easily
politicized, perhaps even more so than a discourse of rights. There are many
illustrations, both historical and contemporary. The recent instances of
humanitarian responses in Kosovo, the Balkans and Rwanda suggest that the
justice response is not necessarily linked to other forms of humanitarian
intervention, but rather, that there is a highly political dimension to this form of
human rights discourse. While in the Balkans and Rwanda, the discourse of
international justice was deployed in lieu of other intervention; in Kosovo,
justice was just one element of a broader NATO military intervention.31
26. See generally infra notes 43-54 and accompanying text.
27. See infra text accompanying notes 34-42.
28. See Ruti G. Teitel, Humanity’s Law: Rule of Law for the New Global Politics, 35
CORNELL INT’L L.J. (forthcoming 2002).
29. For a historical perspective, see Ruti Teitel, Human Rights Genealogy, 66 FORDHAM L.
REV. 301 (1997).
30. See generally HUGO GROTIUS, RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE: INCLUDING THE LAW OF
NATURE AND OF NATIONS (A.C. Campbell, A.M. trans., 2d ed. 1979); PERCY BORDWELL, THE
LAW OF WAR BETWEEN BELLIGERENTS: A HISTORY AND COMMENTARY (1908).
31. See Teitel, supra note 22, at 179; United Nations: Secretary-General’s Report on
Aspects of Establishing an International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former
Yugoslavia, May 3, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1159.
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Indeed, to whatever extent the discourse of justice can be considered to
imply a “rights” discourse, the relevant human rights at stake are neither
political or social rights, but rather constitute the most minimal and threshold
of rights: These are the rights against persecution and annihilation—rights
preservative of bodily integrity.
Moreover, individual human rights protecting against “persecution” and
“ethnic cleansing” link up the rights of individuals with the rights of “peoples,”
to remain in their territories. The significance of this rights protection is that it
goes beyond the prevailing view of international human rights linked up to the
protection of preexisting national borders. Just as the state sovereignty
principle reinforced the commitment to nationalism that defined the old
international law system, at present, there is an evident link between the new
system of protecting human rights against ethnic cleansing, and the
reconceptualization of the meaning of stable borders associated with
globalization. This is the new global rule of law.
A related question concerns these international legal developments bearing
to U.S. human rights policy. Professor Koh has engaged this issue more
directly in his other writings, specifically, the question of whether, and to what
extent, international human rights law, particularly, customary law should be
considered to constitute a part of internal domestic law.32 There is presently an
extensive debate in the United States upon the relevance of international law to
its domestic legal system.33
But, this question gets back to the issue of the role of human rights law;
and impliedly, relatedly, and more specifically, to what extent the United
States regards itself as needing human rights law? This, in turn, again raises
the question of what human rights law is for? The inconsistency of the United
States’ approach towards the recently expanded justice discourse may well
reflect the tensions implicit in the contemporary expansion of human rights
law. Indeed, the American posture regarding human rights law, particularly,
its “exceptionalism,” may be an important indicator of the relationship of
human rights law to political realities.34

32. For the historical eighteenth century view, see Blackstone. For the modern view, see
Louis Henkin, International Law as Law in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1555 (1984).
33. There is a growing literature on both sides of the debate. Compare Curtis A. Bradley &
Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts and the Incorporation of International Law, 111 HARV. L.
REV. 2260 (1998), with Harold Hongju Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?, 111 HARV.
L. REV. 1824 (1998). See Henkin, supra note 33.
34. See The Politics and Political Uses of Human Rights Discourse: A Conference on
Rethinking Human Rights, Columbia University, Nov. 8-9, 2001, available at
http://www.sipa.columbia.edu/REGIONAL/IAS/eventspage/events%20page.htm#Conferences
(last visited Mar. 12, 2002).
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Here, we need to acknowledge the extent to which the turn to a discourse
of “justice” is not fully continuous with politics.35 What, therefore, is the
meaning of current humanitarian policy, whereby democratizing developments
in foreign affairs correlate with the expansion of international criminal justice?
These somewhat paradoxical developments point in various directions
suggesting a plausible role for the principle of international justice as a limiting
principle, namely, as a check on the unlimited actualization of the prevailing
principle of self-determination in the international sphere. International law
and justice processes can be used to limit the political principle of selfdetermination, as these always have the potential for secession and
destabilizing transition.
The spread of democratization, together with the attendant difficulty of
obtaining consensus among a larger number of states,36 constitutes the present
political circumstances that are the basis for the current turn to law, and
relatedly to judicial rather than political mechanisms of decision-making in
foreign affairs. Illustrative in this regard are the determinations regarding the
humanitarian crises in the Bosnian and Rwandan political contexts and
circumstances, and, in particular, the determinations made by the Security
Council (as opposed to the General Assembly),37 as the Chapter Seven
peacemaking powers were the jurisdictional bases for the convening of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.38
These adjudicatory processes comprised the primary form of intervention by

35. See generally MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS
(1999). Of course, there are also continuities of the law and politics. For discussion of this rule
of law dilemma, see Ruti Teitel, Transitional Jurisprudence: The Role of Law in Political
Transformation, 106 YALE L.J. 2009, 2016-30 (1997). See also DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE
OF ADJUDICATION (1997).
36. In recent decades, the number of member states in the United Nations General Assembly
has grown to 189. See The U.N. in Brief, available at http://www.un.org/Overview/brief.html
(last visited Jan. 16, 2002).
37. It was widely conceded at the time that obtaining any form of agreement in the General
Assembly would be very difficult. Letter from Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Secretary General of the
United Nations, to the President of the Security Counsel (May 24, 1994), available at
http://www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/comexpert/Intr.htm.
38. Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former
Yugoslavia since 1991, S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, adopting U.N. Doc S/25704 at 36, Annex,
and U.N. Doc. S/25704/Add.1 (1993), available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/icty/
statute.html; Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, S.C. Res.
827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993), as amended by S.C.
Res. 1166, U.N. SCOR, 3878th mtg., Annex, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1166 (1998), available at
http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1998/sres1166.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2002); Statute of the
International Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453rd mtg., U.N.
Doc. S/RES/955 (1994), available at http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1994/9443748e.htm (last
visited Apr. 1, 2002).
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the international community in these conflicts. Seen from a historical vantage
point, these instances of adjudications pose profound questions about the
apparent contemporary displacement of more political international responses,
by the law, and more specifically the international criminal law.
Indeed, the limits of the law in response to atrocities are conceded by
Professor Koh,39 implying that where there is a chance to avert such human
rights violations, such as genocide, military intervention may be justified.40
This role of the new humanitarian law is not fully transparent, though it is
becoming more so.41 Nevertheless, this sort of humanitarian intervention
needs to be subject to some form of rule of law, lest it become politicized.42
IV. ON GLOBAL RULE OF LAW
Beyond the truth and justice principles applicable to states, Professor
Koh’s address also contends for a broader view of accountability in the new
global society. In the third part of Koh’s address, he turns to the challenge of
globalization. Here, importantly, Professor Koh seeks to reconcile human
rights ideology with globalization. Koh contends for alternative forms of
accountability generated by transnationalism, such as principles of corporate
responsibility and the roles of transnational networks,43 where he advocates
ways to effect social justice through “networks of concern.”44 To be sure,
globalization has resulted in the reallocation of structures, processes that
highlight the role of diverse non-state actors, such as transnational
corporations.45 These developments raise many questions, regarding what

39. See Koh, supra note 5, at 311-15.
40. Id. Indeed one might say, in this regard, that the new justice regime plays a twofold role,
as it both constrains state power, but also enables justified intervention.
41. Though it has become more so, insofar as the responses are relegated to the international
community.
42. For example, see the multiple Reports of the Secretary-General on the United Nations
Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, including S/2000/177 (Mar. 3, 2000), available at
http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/2000/177e.pdf; S/2000/538 (June 6, 2000), available at
http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/2000/538e.pdf; S/2000/878 (Sept. 18, 2000), available at
http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/2000/878e.pdf; and S/2000/1196 (Dec. 15, 2000), available at
http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/2000/1196e.pdf.
43. See Koh, supra note 5, at 319-22. See also generally Harold Hongju Koh, The 1998
Frankel Lecture: Bringing International Law Home, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 623 (1998) (discussing
transnational networks).
44. See MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS:
ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1998).
45. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order, 76 FOREIGN AFF. 183, 193
(1997). See generally, ULRICH BECK, WHAT IS GLOBALIZATION 102-03, 132 (2000) (discussing
the “transnational” state).
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obligations corporations are prepared to undertake, and what mechanisms of
accountability.46
Professor Koh importantly observes the complexity of the new
transnationalism, in particular, the processes he describes—of incorporation of
international law into domestic law. Accounting for this process requires new
interpretive principles regarding the force of international law as its effects in
global society go beyond direct (first order) regulation of consenting states.
This is seen, in particular, in the contemporary debate regarding the weight of
customary international law in domestic law.47
It is also important in this regard to recognize that the reallocations of
power associated with globalization are occurring in a number of directions,
both disaggregatory, and also centralizing of authority, in a variety of
transnational and international mechanisms. This has several implications. At
the same time as globalization is proceeding, there is a parallel expansion of
internationalism that needs to be recognized—in particular, the degree to
which many transnational developments are themselves predicated on
precedent changes in international law. The Pinochet litigation serves as a case
in point.48 While the extradition of General Pinochet is generally regarded as a
precedent in transnationalism, and universal jurisdictions, the transnational
elements in the case depended on international developments law such as
English adoption of the International Convention Against Torture.49 Indeed,
the Pinochet extradition, while it is represented as an instance of domestic
incorporation of universal jurisdiction, could not have happened, if not for
precedent developments in international law—namely, the adoption by
England of the Convention, according “crimes against humanity” universal
jurisdiction.50 “Crimes against humanity” offenses are for the most part

46. Here, too, there is a growing literature. See PAUL KENNEDY, PREPARING FOR THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (1993) (discussing the complexity of corporate responsibility in
globalization).
47. Much of the debate appears to have gone off in the direction of the positive/natural law
debates, namely framing the question: to what extent is international law, law? See generally
H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (2d ed. 1994).
48. See Regina v. Bow St. Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate, Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte, [2000]
1 A.C. 61 (H.L. 1998), reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 1302 (1998), vacated by Regina v. Bow St. Metro.
Stipendiary Magistrate, Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 2), [2000] 1 A.C. 119 (H.L. 1999),
reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 430 (1999); Regina v. Bow St. Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate, Ex parte
Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3), [2000] 1 A.C. 147 (1999).
49. See generally id.
50. See Richard J. Wilson, Prosecuting Pinochet: International Crimes in Spanish Domestic
Law, 21 HUM. RTS. Q. 927 (1999); Menno T. Kamminga, Lessons Learned from the Exercise of
Universal Jurisdiction in Respect of Gross Human Rights Offenses, 23 HUM. RTS. Q. 940, 946
(2001).
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defined, first and foremost, as a matter of international law.51 In this regard,
the “incorporation” process of lawmaking described by Professor Koh appears
to work in both directions: to be sure, domestic law and state practice influence
developments in international law, but the converse is also true.
Of course, there are important differences between the progress in
developments via transnationalism versus internationalism, particularly in
terms of the accountability concerns previously discussed. If, the globalization
debates are relevant indicators, there may well be legitimacy problems in
relegating critical decision-making to the private sector. Without adequate
safeguards, there is a lack of transparency and accountability. By contrast,
international fora, while often unwieldy, carry their own form of legitimacy.
International fora imply numerous levels of deliberative processes which
constitute a form of accountability.52 To whatever extent, we may now be at
an apparent crossroad regarding normative policy on decision making
structures, there are reasons to prefer internationalism.
Finally, some of the problems, or “discontents,” of globalization need to be
more fully aired.53 Namely, one would need to acknowledge the extent to
which the supposed globalization of democratic freedoms and market economy
have somehow gone hand in hand with a justice discourse. However, rather
than the present political changes as an opportunity for contestation of
economic and social realities, the role of law here seems primarily preservative
of the existing status quo regarding property relations, and, as such, is aimed at
maintenance of the underside of globalization. Further, there are significant
questions regarding security that also appear in some degree to be associated
with globalization. These questions, as well as a greater engagement with
issues of social justice, need to be more fully the subject of human rights
discourse.54

51. See U.N. Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes
and Crimes Against Humanity, Nov. 26, 1968, 8 I.L.M. 68 (1969). See generally GEOFFREY
ROBERTSON QC, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: THE STRUGGLE FOR GLOBAL JUSTICE (2000).
52. Thus for example, see Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, Fourth World
Conference on Women, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.177/20 and U.N. Doc. A/CONF.177/20/Add.1
(1995).
53. See generally SASKIA SASSEN, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (1998).
54. On development generally, see THOMAS CAROTHERS, AIDING DEMOCRACY ABROAD:
THE LEARNING CURVE (1999). On the link between terrorism and poverty, see Kofi Annan, U.N.
Secretary General, Address to the Center for Preventive Action at the Council On Foreign
Relations (Mar. 6, 2002). See also Barbara Crossette, Annan Says Terrorism’s Roots Are
Broader Than Poverty, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2002, at A13 (“Speaking at the Center for
Preventative Action at the Council on Foreign Relations, Mr. [Kofi Annan] also said the world’s
failure over a decade to act on warning signs in Afghanistan, battered by political, economic and
natural disasters, resulted in the catastrophe of Sept. 11.”).
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V. POST SEPTEMBER 11—DEMOCRATIZATION, DEVELOPMENT AND HUMAN
RIGHTS
In the concluding part of his address, Professor Koh turns to consider the
responses to the September 11, 2001 attack on the United States. He proposes
the promotion of democratization and global freedom as appropriate responses
to the challenge of global terrorism.55
The proposal is, no doubt, right. There needs to be a renewed emphasis on
democracy-building and rule of law, although this is, no doubt, a very longterm solution to the problems of terrorism. Virtually all of the Middle East is
struggling with the challenges of modernism and democratic reform.56
September 11 may well be a signal to the rest of the world about the present
status of this process. Accordingly, in this regard, Professor Koh advises
greater involvement in the promotion of the “right to democracy.”57 There are
difficult questions ahead for the United States and other established
democracies about what their role is to be in this process. To be sure, after
decades of aid for assistance in building rule of law in transitional
democracies, we need to evaluate our successes, but also our failures, and
factor in lessons from other regions.58 The nature of this process is, no doubt,
all the more problematic because much of the region is skeptical about, and
even opposed to, such foreign aid. Demands for autonomy should be
respected, so long as the human rights of ethnic minorities within these states
are respected.59 And, there also needs to be an adequate regard for the
international concern of the exportation of terrorism.
The above suggests an important role for the developing human rights
discourse. Indeed, human rights discourse emerges as a potentially powerful
counter discourse to the separatist ideology that nourishes terrorism. In the
struggle against terrorism, what is needed is a universalizing discourse with

55. See Koh, supra note 5, at 332 (referring to the “globalization of democracy as an
antidote to the globalization of terror.”). See also Measures to Eliminate International
Terrorism, G.A. Res. 55/158, U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 55th Sess., Agenda Item 164, at 1-4, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/55/158 (2001), available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/55/a55r158.pdf
(Jan. 30, 2001) (defining terrorism).
56. See AHMED RASHID, JIHAD: THE RISE OF MILITANT ISLAM IN CENTRAL ASIA (2002).
57. See LOUIS HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS (1990). On the rights to democratic
governance, see Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J.
INT’L L. 46, 53 (1992).
58. See generally CAROTHERS, supra note 54.
59. See generally Igor I. Lukashuk, The United Nations and Illegitimate Regimes: When to
Intervene to Protect Human Rights, in LAW AND FORCE IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER
143 (Lori Fisler Damrosch & David J. Scheffer eds., 1991); Thomas M. Franck, Intervention
Against Illegitimate Regimes, in LAW AND FORCE IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER, supra, at
159. See generally BRAD R. ROTH, GOVERNMENTAL ILLEGITIMACY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
(1999).
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transnational force. Human rights discourse constitutes the leading contender
because of the force of its ideology, global reach and broad appeal.
Human rights discourse’s potential is directed precisely at the problem of
ideology that offers the basis for radical fundamentalism—namely, the
constitution of political identity in contemporary global politics. The discourse
of human rights is aimed specifically at the problem of ethnic and religious
persecution.60 This discourse ought to help to respond to the current attempts
to ethnically cleanse and/or segregate on a religious or ethnic basis. In this
regard, simple adherence to the longstanding principle of state selfdetermination will not work. Whether in the Middle East or elsewhere in
present global politics, this highlights the basis for the present emergence of
the new humanitarian regime which incorporates human rights; indeed, the
enforcement of rights protecting against ethnic cleansing could usefully be
considered to constitute enforceable limits on principles of sovereignty and
self-determination.
This implies a very delicate balance. The international community’s
protection of threshold rights against persecution internal to states, whether in
the Middle East or elsewhere, has global repercussions. While, at some level,
the protected rights are those of individuals, they are also rights of the ethnic
collective, as well as rights which protect the stability of populations and
property.61 As such, the now emerging humanitarian principle therefore
constitutes a comprehensive rule of law for the new global politics.
VI. CONCLUSION
These comments have sought to engage some of the proposed strategies
advocated in Professor Koh’s inspiring Childress address. Most important is
the question of what is to be the bearing of human rights ideology in U.S.
foreign policy and the extent to which human rights can meet the challenges of
the twenty-first century. Here, we should recognize that human rights law
neither constitutes a pure discourse of political power, nor, conversely, does it
only reflect an expression of powerlessness. Relatedly, human rights law is
not merely a set of rights, nor, is it just a set of coercive sanctions. Moreover,
no doubt, a dimension of human rights law is not static, but plausibly involves
a transformative politics. At this early point in its development, the human
rights regime might aptly be considered to constitute a discourse, and as such,

60. See Final Report of the United Nations Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to
Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), U.N. GAOR, Annex I, paras. 129-33, U.N. Doc.
S/1994/674/ (1992) (defining ethnic cleansing).
61. See id. para. 130. (“[E]thnic cleansing is a purposeful policy designed by one ethnic or
religious group to remove by violent and terror-inspiring means the civilian population of another
ethnic or religious group from certain geographic areas.”).
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can be used for a range of foreign affairs purposes, from preserving the
political status quo, to other more emancipatory and ameliorative purposes.
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